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Hunger Strikes at Guantanamo — Medical Ethics and Human 
Rights in a “Legal Black Hole”
George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H.
Being Human, a collection of readings assembled 
by President George W. Bush’s Council on Bio-
ethics, contains a powerful description of the 
force-feeding of Soviet political prisoner Vladi-
mir Bukovsky, who was on a hunger strike to pro-
test the refusal of prison authorities to provide 
a lawyer for a fellow inmate who was awaiting 
trial:
They started feeding me forcibly through 
the nostril. By a rather thick rubber tube 
with a metal end on it. . . . The procedure 
will be that four or five KGB guys will come 
to my cell, take me to a medical unit, put a 
straitjacket on me, tie me up to a table, and 
somebody will be still holding, even so I 
was tied down, holding my shoulders and 
head and legs, and one will be pushing this 
thing through my nostril. . . . It’s painful 
like hell I must tell you, because for some 
reason nose is very sensitive part of body 
and the tears will be filling your eyes and 
sort of streaming down because it’s so pain-
ful, and — awful thing.1
This procedure was repeated daily for 12 days. 
Any participation by physicians in this force-
feeding in the prison’s “medical unit” would al-
most certainly have been condemned by the Coun-
cil on Bioethics. Of course, it is easy to condemn 
the brutal actions of Soviet-era jailers against po-
litical dissidents. It is much more difficult to ad-
dress the acts of our own country, especially acts, 
different only in the degree, that have been used 
by U.S. military physicians against hunger strik-
ers at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.2,3
On September 11, 2005, 131 prisoners at Guan-
tanamo were on hunger strikes. At the end of 
2005, that number was 84.2 In January 2006, a 
new technique was introduced in the prison camp 
to break the hunger strike: the use of an “emer-
gency restraint chair.” The chair is described by 
its inventor, a former sheriff whose jailer had 
been injured by a prisoner, as a “padded cell on 
wheels.” 4 His company has shipped 25 such chairs 
to Guantanamo. The prisoner can be strapped 
into one of them in six-point restraints, includ-
ing not just the hands and feet, but also the head 
and torso, and safely transported to a medical 
care facility. The chair was not designed for either 
treatment or punishment. Nonetheless, at Guan-
tanamo, beginning in early 2006, these chairs 
were being used to immobilize prisoners on hun-
ger strikes and force-feed them. And it succeeded. 
As of February 22, 2006, reportedly only three de-
tainees were still being force-fed in the restraint 
chairs, and in June 2006 that number remained 
the same.3
The medical records of the Guantanamo pris-
oners who have been force-fed in the restraint 
chairs, some of which have been introduced into 
evidence in pending lawsuits to enjoin further 
use of the chairs, contain what appears to be a 
preprinted “medical officer note” that is in many 
ways as chilling as Bukovsky’s description of his 
own force-feeding, especially because it reflects 
the detached clinical viewpoint of the physicians 
instead of the viewpoint of the prisoner:
Despite being advised that hunger striking 
is detrimental to his health, the detainee 
refuses to eat. Restraints were ordered for 
medical necessity to facilitate feeding the de-
tainee. There is no evidence that medica-
tions or a medical process is causing this 
detainee’s refusal to eat. Detainee does not 
have any medical condition/disability that 
would place him at greater risk during feed-
ing using medical restraints. Detainee was 
told that he will remain in restraints until 
feed and postfeed observation time (60–120 
minutes) is completed. Detainee under-
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stands that if he eats, that involuntary feeding 
in medical restraints will no longer be re-
quired.
GITMO Dr. ______________
The medical records of 20-year-old Guantana-
mo prisoner Yousif Al-Shehri, for example, con-
tain this identical entry twice a day for 8 con-
secutive days from January 18 to January 25, 2006, 
after which his records indicate that he ended 
his hunger strike and became “compliant.” The 
name of the physician who signed the orders has 
been redacted. 
Force-feeding by physicians of competent pris-
oners on hunger strikes is widely condemned as 
being both illegal and unethical.5 But some con-
troversies persist, most of which are related to 
the assessment of the prisoner’s competence and 
motivation, as well as the probable effect of a suc-
cessful hunger strike on prison security.
The Guantanamo Hunger Strikes
Various types of hunger strikes have been occur-
ring at Guantanamo almost since it became an 
interrogation center for terrorist suspects in ear-
ly 2002.6 As many as 200 prisoners have been on 
hunger strikes at once, and there were probably 
about 100 on hunger strikes in November 2005, 
when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was 
asked, “Do you approve of the force-feeding of 
detainees [at Guantanamo] who are on hunger 
strike?” He replied, “I’m not a doctor and I’m not 
the kind of a person who would be in a position 
to approve or disapprove. . . . The responsible 
people are the combatant commanders.” 7 In short, 
the policy of the Department of Defense is that 
the decision whether or not to force-feed a pris-
oner at Guantanamo is a military one to be made 
by the base commander; the decision about how 
to actually force-feed a prisoner is a medical one 
to be made by military physicians.
The use of physicians to aggressively break a 
prison hunger strike raises complex medical eth-
ics and legal issues that have been the subject of 
international debate for decades. U.S. courts have 
occasionally been asked to rule on the legality of 
force-feeding prisoners, and they have usually per-
mitted it if done by a physician in a medically rea-
sonable manner for the primary purpose of either 
preventing suicide or maintaining order in the 
prison.8-12 I have written about hunger strikes 
a number of times and in 1982 concluded, “We 
restrict the rights of prisoners in many ways. 
Force-feeding them rather than permitting them 
to starve themselves to death is probably one of 
the most benign.”12 This is also the position the 
Department of Defense takes on the Guantana-
mo hunger strikes. As the most senior civilian 
physician in the Pentagon, William Winkenwerder, 
Jr., said in response to questions about breaking 
the most recent Guantanamo hunger strike, “There 
is a moral question. Do you allow a person to com-
mit suicide? Or do you take steps to protect their 
health and preserve their life?”2,13
But both my 1982 position and Winken-
werder’s 2006 position seem overly simplistic 
and mechanistic in the context of Guantanamo, 
and I grossly underestimated the pain and med-
ical complications force-feeding can impose on a 
competent prisoner. Physicians must answer three 
related questions to determine their legal and eth-
ical obligations to hunger strikers in prison: Is 
the prisoner on a hunger strike? When is it ethi-
cal for a physician to force-feed a hunger striker? 
And what means can be used by a physician to 
force-feed a hunger striker?
What Is a Hunger Strike?
Hunger strikes in prison are dangerous for both 
prisoners and jailers, but they are often the only 
way, or the last resort, for prisoners to protest the 
conditions of their confinement. Hunger strikes 
in prison can result in death when the govern-
ment refuses to either negotiate or force-feed; this 
happened to members of the Irish Republican 
Army who went on a hunger strike in the Maze 
Prison in the early 1980s and to hunger strikers in 
Turkish prisons in 1996 and from 2000 to 2003.14
Hernan Reyes of the International Committee 
of the Red Cross has written the most authorita-
tive article on hunger strikes, which he also terms 
“voluntary total fasting.”15 According to Reyes, 
fasting, voluntariness, and a stated purpose are 
all needed before a prisoner can be said to be on 
a hunger strike. Simply refusing to eat as a reac-
tion to a specific situation, whether in frustration 
or anger, for example, does not qualify as a hun-
ger strike. Thus, the initial rounds of fasting at 
Guantanamo in early 2002 in response to specific 
actions of the guards toward individual prison-
ers do not count.6 Nor do prisoners who refuse 
to eat as a result of severe depression or other 
mental illness, and with no goal in mind other 
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than their own death, qualify as legitimate hun-
ger strikers.
The determination to fast until either politi-
cal demands are met or death occurs may vary 
from person to person. This is especially true when 
fasting occurs in groups, since members of the 
group may be less free to break the fast; peer 
pressure must be taken into account by physi-
cians when deciding whether prisoner-patient is 
voluntarily continuing to refuse food.14,15 The de-
termination of the hunger striker will also sug-
gest the likely medical consequences of continu-
ing the hunger strike. Most hunger strikers, for 
example, have taken some water, salt, sugar, and 
vitamin B
1
 at least for a time before asserting an 
intention to fast to death.14 Physicians should in-
form hunger strikers that intake of these nutri-
ents considerably decreases the chances of per-
manent disability should the strike end before 
death (which is never the desired end point of a 
true hunger striker).
In its Declaration of Tokyo, the World Medi-
cal Association ruled out physician participation 
in the force-feeding of prisoners. Nonetheless, 
its more specific Declaration of Malta (Declara-
tion on Hunger Strikers) permits physicians to 
attend to a prison hunger striker in the context 
of a traditional physician–patient relationship if 
consent and confidentiality can be maintained. 
As compared with the International Committee 
of the Red Cross’s definition, the World Medical 
Association’s definition of a hunger striker is 
much broader in that it does not require a spe-
cific goal: “A hunger striker is a mentally com-
petent person who has indicated that he has de-
cided to embark on a hunger strike and has 
refused to take food and/or fluids for a signifi-
cant interval.”16
Should Physicians Participate in Force-
Feeding Hunger Strikers at Guantanamo?
It is a violation of medical ethics for military 
physicians to treat competent patients against 
their will solely for military or political purposes 
or for punishment. The Department of Defense 
seems to understand this, and so it has publicly 
relied on two basic rationales for ordering mili-
tary physicians to force-feed prisoners: it is in 
the best medical interest of prisoners, and it is 
done in accordance with regulations issued by 
the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Prisons re-
garding hunger strikes in federal prisons.13
Both arguments seem reasonable, but neither 
fits the facts at Guantanamo. The first — that 
force-feeding is in the best medical interests of 
prisoners — is acceptable if it applies only to 
prisoners who are not actually on hunger strikes 
(as defined by the International Committee of 
the Red Cross), but rather have stopped eating 
because of a mental illness such as depression 
and can reasonably be declared incompetent to 
refuse treatment, including force-feeding, if and 
when such feeding is necessary to sustain their 
lives or health. So to the extent that an individu-
al competency assessment has been properly 
conducted and the prisoner is found to fit into 
this category, force-feeding is medically indicat-
ed. This category is not likely to apply to many 
prisoners at Guantanamo, however. As Major 
General Jay W. Hood, the camp’s commander, 
told a group of visiting physicians in the fall of 
2005, the prisoners at Guantanamo are protest-
ing their confinement; they are not suicidal.17
The second argument — that force-feeding is 
in accordance with regulations by the Bureau of 
Prisons regarding hunger strikes — requires a 
closer examination of these regulations.18 They 
are triggered when the person on a hunger strike 
“communicates that fact to staff and is observed 
by staff to be refraining from eating for a period 
of time, ordinarily in excess of 72 hours.” On 
referral for medical evaluation, the inmate shall 
undergo a medical and psychiatric examination 
and be placed “in a medically appropriate locked 
room for close monitoring” (if necessary to ac-
curately measure food and fluid intake and out-
put). There, his or her weight and vital signs are 
to be checked at least every 24 hours.18 If and 
when the physician determines “that the inmate’s 
life or health will be threatened if treatment is 
not initiated immediately,” the physician shall 
make “reasonable efforts to convince the inmate 
to voluntarily accept treatment,” including ex-
plaining the risks of refusing, and shall docu-
ment these efforts. After such efforts (or in an 
emergency), if “a medical necessity for immedi-
ate treatment of a life- or health-threatening situ-
ation exists, the physician may order that treat-
ment be administered without the consent of 
the inmate.”18
Whether or not one thinks these are reason-
able regulations, only a physician (not the war-
den) is permitted to make treatment decisions 
on the basis of them, and then only after rea-
health law, ethics, and human rights
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sonable attempts to obtain voluntary compliance. 
To the extent that military commanders are mak-
ing the decisions about force-feeding, the rules 
of the Bureau of Prisons are not being followed 
at Guantanamo. This may be why the immediate 
past commander of the medical group responsible 
for prisoner health care, Navy Captain John S. Ed-
mondson, said that military health care personnel 
are screened before they are deployed to Guan-
tanamo “to ensure that they do not have ethical 
objections to assisted feeding.”17 In addition, ac-
cording to the rules of the Bureau of Prisons, 72 
hours of fasting triggers a medical evaluation — 
it does not trigger emergency force-feeding, which 
generally occurs after weeks, if not months, of 
continuous fasting.18
U.S. courts have generally upheld actions like 
those authorized by the Bureau of Prisons at least 
as long as the actual force-feeding (misleadingly 
described as “assisted feeding”) is performed by 
a physician in accordance with good and accept-
ed medical procedures and the prisoner is either 
suicidal or the treatment refusal presents a con-
siderable security problem for the entire prison. 
In terms of U.S. constitutional law, competent 
prisoners have a right to refuse treatment, but 
prison officials may overrule it when they have a 
“legitimate penological interest,” which includes 
preventing suicide among prisoners and main-
taining order in the prison itself.19 Of course, 
the major difference is that federal prisoners have 
access to lawyers, U.S. courts, and independent 
physicians to challenge treatments they believe 
are abusive.
Medical Means to Force-Feed Hunger Strikers
The much more complex question concerning 
medical ethics is what a physician should do af-
ter a competent hunger striker becomes incom-
petent and it reasonably appears that he or she 
will die or sustain permanent injury without food, 
and there is no reasonable possibility that his or 
her demands will be met. Two positions have been 
articulated, neither of which is terribly persuasive. 
The World Medical Association holds that “when 
the hunger striker has become confused and is 
therefore unable to make an unimpaired decision 
or has lapsed into a coma, the doctor shall be free 
to make the decision for his patient as to further 
treatment which he considers to be in the best in-
terest of that patient.”16 The World Medical Asso-
ciation nonetheless requires the physician to hon-
or the patient-prisoner’s previous decision to fast 
to the death unless the physician has informed 
the prisoner of his or her inability to honor this 
wish and can engage another attending physi-
cian for the prisoner.16 The Declaration of Malta 
has been described as “wholly inadequate” be-
cause of the discretion it allows physicians.20 
As compared with the World Medical Associ-
ation’s statement, the position of the Royal Dutch 
Medical Association, drafted in response to hun-
ger strikes by Vietnamese asylum seekers, is more 
specific and less ambiguous. It suggests that hun-
ger strikers should have access to a “doctor of 
confidence” who will act as their physician and 
keep them fully informed of the medical conse-
quences of the hunger strike, but also follow their 
wishes of nontreatment in case they become in-
competent or comatose.21 To reduce uncertainty 
in the case of incompetence, the Dutch guide-
lines call for hunger strikers to sign a specific 
“statement of nonintervention” (similar to a living 
will) that directs their care and rules out artifi-
cial or forced feeding. This written statement is 
not to be made public unless and until the pris-
oner-patient actually becomes incompetent. Of 
course, it would be nice if all prisoners had ac-
cess to independent physicians, whether they are 
called doctors of confidence or not. The major 
problem at Guantanamo, however, is precisely that 
the only physicians any prisoner has access to are 
the military physicians at the base. Moreover, the 
solution of a living will is no solution at all, since 
it suggests that the prisoner might have made 
confidential arrangements with the physician to 
“save” him or her before he or she dies or suffers 
serious harm, and so undercuts the power of the 
hunger strike itself.22,23
U.S. military officials have said that they will 
not permit anyone at Guantanamo to “fast to 
death” because of the likely consequences con-
cerning international propaganda, which could 
pose a global security risk. Since the first three 
suicides by hanging at Guantanamo in June 2006, 
however, this rationale is less persuasive. All 
three of these prisoners had been hunger strikers 
at one time or another, and at least one of them, 
Ali Abdullah Ahmed, had been repeatedly sub-
jected to the emergency restraint chair. Dr. Win-
ken werder’s position that the military can re-
write the Declaration of Malta to permit earlier 
intervention because it “only makes good sense” 
to force-feed hunger strikers before they become 
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incompetent or are “near death” is also not per-
suasive.24
Prevention of the deaths of incompetent pris-
oners is a laudable medical goal. The use of emer-
gency restraint chairs for force-feeding, however, 
can never be ethically, legally, or medically justi-
fied — even in the case of an incompetent sui-
cidal prisoner whose competence was determined 
by a qualified psychiatrist. A prisoner who needs 
to be forcibly restrained in this device for force-
feeding is almost certainly strong enough to be 
in little or no health danger from continuing a 
fast. The primary justification for the use of this 
device for force-feeding seems to be punishment 
rather than medical care.2,3 The use of any med-
ical intervention as punishment is prohibited by 
all relevant international treaties, principles of 
medical ethics, and U.S. constitutional law.25,26 
The restraint chair is the functional equivalent of 
the Soviet straitjacket. Use of the restraint chair 
for “postfeed observation” during which the pris-
oner must urinate and defecate on himself or her-
self seems designed more for humiliation and 
subjugation than for medical treatment.  
Medical Ethics at Guantanamo
There seems to be real tension between the phy-
sicians at Guantanamo, most of whom are under 
the command of the Navy at the hospital, and 
the Army commanders who are in charge of the 
prisoners and their interrogations. It is often ar-
gued that a physician in the military should rarely 
have to decide whether to be a military officer first 
and a physician second or a physician first and 
a military officer second.27 At Guantanamo, how-
ever, the choice is stark. Military physicians can-
not follow military orders to force-feed competent 
prisoners without violating basic precepts of med-
ical ethics never to harm them by means of their 
medical knowledge. New medical instructions 
from the Department of Defense, dated June 6, 
2006, acknowledge that involuntary treatment 
should be preceded by “a thorough medical and 
mental health evaluation of the detainee and 
counseling concerning the risks of refusing treat-
ment” and that any treatment should be “carried 
out in a medically appropriate manner.” These in-
structions would rule out the use of emergency 
restraint chairs, but nonetheless continue to per-
mit force-feeding of mentally competent prison-
ers.13,24
Guantanamo has been called a “gulag,” an 
“anomaly,” “the legal equivalent of outer space,” 
and a “legal black hole.” The Supreme Court ruled 
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld in June 2006 that the Geneva 
Conventions have full force in Guantanamo as a 
matter of both U.S. and international law.28 This 
ruling reversed the Bush Administration’s policy 
on Guantanamo and has been widely hailed, es-
pecially by military lawyers. The Court also ruled 
that Geneva’s Common Article 3 applies to all 
prisoners in custody. This article not only bans 
the use of tribunals that are not “regularly con-
stituted” (the issue in Hamdan), but also requires 
all prisoners to be “treated humanely” and ex-
plicitly prohibits “cruel treatment and torture” as 
well as “outrages upon personal dignity, in par-
ticular, humiliating and degrading treatment.” 
Four of the justices also ruled that the protocols 
to the Geneva Conventions, although not ratified 
by the United States, are binding international 
laws. This is important, since the protocols spe-
cifically prohibit interference with actions by phy-
sicians that are consistent with medical ethics. 
Treatment of incompetent hunger strikers in pris-
on remains complex. Use of the restraint chairs 
to break a hunger strike by a competent prisoner, 
however, is a violation of both medical ethics and 
of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conven-
tions, which after Hamdan all Department of De-
fense personnel have been ordered to follow.29
Force-feeding at Guantanamo and the Hamdan 
opinion provide the opportunity for the U.S. mili-
tary to adopt as formal military doctrine the rule 
that a physician in the military is always a physi-
cian first and a military officer second. They also 
provide the President’s Council on Bioethics with 
an opportunity to take a position on one of the 
most important international bioethics issues of 
our day. American military physicians always have 
the obligation to disobey an unlawful order and 
the option to disobey an order that is contrary 
to medical ethics, but the “physician first” doctrine 
would make it much less likely that any such or-
ders would be issued in the first place.
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